Liability of a Municipal Corporation for Defective Streets and Sidewalks by Hagen, Marvin E.
Montana Law Review 
Volume 7 
Issue 1 Spring 1946 Article 6 
1946 
Liability of a Municipal Corporation for Defective Streets and 
Sidewalks 
Marvin E. Hagen 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Let us know how access to this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Marvin E. Hagen, Liability of a Municipal Corporation for Defective Streets and Sidewalks, 7 Mont. L. Rev. 
(1946). 
Available at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol7/iss1/6 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Montana Law Review by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. 
For more information, please contact scholarworks@mso.umt.edu. 
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
Court should uphold the doctrine expressed in State v. Aus.,
and State v. Keerl and limit the doctrine of double jeopardy
so as to forbid a trial only in a new and independent case after
the defendant or the State has exhausted its rights to further
proceedings in the original case."
0. Louise Replogle.
'Although stating in the commentaries thereto that, at present, the
State can appeal from a general acquittal only in Connecticut, it is of
interest to note that the American Law Institute has proposed that the
State should have a right to a new trial after general acquittal where
"... in the course of the trial, a material error has been made to the
prejudice of the State." AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, ADMINISTRATION
OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: DOUBLE JEOPARDY, Proposed Final Draft
(1935) Sec. 13, comments, page 111 ff. It also recognizes that a new
trial is only a continuation of the original proceedings in all cases.
Ibid, Sec. 14, comments page 116 ff.
Though R. C. M. 1935, §12108 does not expressly provide for such
new trial for the State, and although R. C. M. 1935, §11612 provides
that no person can be tried a second time after he is once acquitted,
the doctrine of the Keerl and the Aus cases, that a new trial is only
a continuation of the original prosecution will support the granting of
a new trial to the State following a general acquittal. Cf.: State v.
Peck (1928) 83 Mont. 327, 271 P. 707.
LIABILITY OF A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION FOR
DEFECTIVE STREETS AND SIDEWALKS
From the beginning, apart from statute, thirty-four (34)
states have held municipal corporations liable to private action
for injuries resulting from defects or obstructions in streets
or sidewalks based upon the common law right of recovery
against a city for actionable negligence.' The contrary rule
prevails in the New England States and a few others. But
statutes now impose liability in most of the latter class of states!
Montana decisions have consistently recognized the doctrine
of municipal liability for damages to persons or property by
reason of any negligently maintained defects or obstructions in
streets and sidewalks. In one of the earliest cases, Snook v. City
'MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1945) §2901 p. 8.
'MCQUILLAN CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1945) §2901 p. 12.
Generally concerning a public way, the judicial decisions have estab-
lished and imposed obligations upon municipal corporations for the
following reasons: (1) Streets must be constructed in a reasonably
safe manner, and to this end ordinary care must be exercised. (2)
They must at all times be kept in proper repair or in a reasonably
safe condition by the exercise of ordinary diligence and continuous
supervision. (3) Reasonably safe condition or proper repair implies
that bridges, dangerous embankments, walls and declivities near the
way must be safeguarded by adequate railings, barriers or appropriate
signals.
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of Anaconda' the plaintiff was injured when he was precipitated
into a dry stream at night after a bridge had been washed out.
The court in holding the city liable said:
"The power to repair coupled with the exclusive control
of the streets, made it the ministerial duty of the city to
exercise ordinary care to the end that the streets might be
reasonably safe for travel. The duty thus imposed is not
legislative or judicial in character, but ministerial."
The city's duty to maintain sidewalks in a reasonably safe
condition is not affected by a city ordinance requiring an abut-
ting owner to keep sidewalks in repair. Thus, in Headley v.
Hammond Building, Inc.' the court said:
"The ordinance merely makes the abutting owner joint
agent with city officials for the performance of the city's
duties and does not affect the primary duty of the city to
keep its streets, including the sidewalks in a reasonably safe
condition for travel."
In the majority of jurisdictions a distinction is drawn be-
tween the liability of municipal corporations and that of quasi-
muncipal corporations. The latter, such as counties, towns and
the like, are held not liable at common law for injuries resulting
from defective highways even in those states which hold that
there is common law liability imposed on municipal corpora-
tions proper.5 But even as to such quasi-corporations, liability
in most jurisdictions, including Montana, is imposed by statute
on counties and towns." In Johnson v. City of Billings,' a county
and a city were engaged in a joint enterprise of constructing a
waste ditch benefiting both; the court held both liable, saying
that:
"Under the statutes of Montana with respect to the
care of highways and liability for injury thereon, counties
and cities stand in the same relation to the traveling public
in so far, at least, as injury results from some act of an
agent of either while engaged in by either in its proprietary,
as distinguished from its governmental capacity."
'(1901) 26 Mont. 128, 66 P. 756.
'(1934) 97 Mont. 243, 33P. (2d) 574.
'MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1945) §2900 p. 7.
OThe legislature has specifically granted to counties the power to "sue
and be sued" (R. C. M. 1921, §4444) and has provided that a suit
against a county must be brought in that county (R. C. M. 1935,
§9095.10). This section is held to permit suits generally against a
county and a county is responsible for inspecting and keeping roads
in repair. (R. C. M. 1935, §§1627 and 1632).
'(1936) 101 Mont. 463, 54 P. (2d) 579.
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However, this doctrine was not extended to hold the State High-
way Commission liable for the death of a passenger in an auto-
mobile accident allegedly caused by the defective, rough and
slippery condition of the state highway.!
While a city must keep its sidewalks in a reasonably safe
condition for public travel, minor defects or obstructions are gen-
erally not actionable. Thus in Sullivan v. City of Butte" the plain-
tiff, while traveling on a cement sidewalk constructed on a 6Y2
percent grade, free from ice and snow, slipped on the iron rim or
collar of a coal-hole extending about a quarter of an inch above
the level of the walk. The majority of the court held as a matter
of law that the defect was not such as would have caused reason-
able men to conclude that an accident was likely to occur as a
result of the defect.
As a general rule, actual or constructive notice to a munici-
pality of the particular defect is essential, unless the public way
has been rendered unsafe by the direct act, order or authority
of the city or town."° Montana has, at an early date, recognized
this distinction between cases which require notioe and those
where notice is unnecessary. The point was covered in the case
of Sweeney v. City of Butte.11 Defendant city had issued a
permit for construction of a cellar under the sidewalk, covered
by double trap doors. The doors were made to open and lie back
flat on the sidewalk. The night of the accident the doors were
lying on the walk. The city authorities knew of the manner in
which they were ordinarily used, but did not know that they
were open at the particular time of the accident. The court in
holding for the plaintiff, declared:
"If the dangerous thing exists for such use, the city
must presume that it will be so used. These trap doors and
this opening, in this case, were for a given use, and the city
certainly cannot avoid liability by demanding that it be
notified every time the dangerous thing is put to the use
'Coldwater v. State Highway Commission (1945) .... Mont ..... 162 P. (2d)
772 "As against the State Highway Commission it was held that such
agency is an arm or branch of the state and cannot be sued without
the state's consent, which the legislature has not given. As against
the members of the Highway Commission, it was held that individual
members of the commission could not, in the absence of legislative
sanction, be held liable unless a showing of actual negligence on their
part could be made."
'(1945) 104 Mont. 225, 157 P. (2d) 79. Justice Angstman (dissenting)
stated: "Whether a sidewalk was slippery or not was a quest4 on of
fact for the jury and their verdict in the lower court should not have
been disturbed."
10MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1945) §2996, p. 290.
"(1895) 15 Mont. 274 39 P. 905.
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intended and contemplated by its existence and construe-
tion. "
The first reported case to adopt the constructive notice
technique in Montana, was the case of Leonard v. City of Butte."
In that case there were four blocks in a cement sidewalk which
differed from the others and were so slippery that one hundred
(100) people had fallen there within a year, and twenty-five
(25) within two months--one of them being seriously hurt,
another being helped up by a policeman. The place had grown
so notorious that it caused amusement among the passers when
persons fell there.
The court on the question of notice declared:
"Evidence showing that a policeman observed an acci-
dent on one occasion, and lent his assistance to aid a woman
who had fallen, tends to show actual notice to the city. But
even without this evidence since the defect existed for such
a length of time and under such circumbstances that the city
or its officers, in the exercise of proper care and diligence
ought to have obtained knowledge of the defect, notice there-
of will be presumed."
A reasonable time to make repairs or remove obstructions,
after the municipality has, or should have, knowledge of the
defect or obstruction, must elapse before it can be held liable
for injuries resulting from such defects or obstructions. The
Montana court in McEnaney v. City of Butte" stated, "an icy
obstruction must have existed for a sufficient length of time to
give the city constructive notice, or that the city had actual
notice of the obstruction for a sufficient length of time to have
enabled it to remove the same."
Shortly after the Leonard case, the legislature enacted Code
Section 5080" commonly known as the "notice" statute. The
courts under the above section did not hesitate to adopt the rule
in the Leonard case in regard to constructive notice, despite the
code provision. In Pullen v. City of Butte,' the plaintiff sus-
tained injuries on a sidewalk where a difference of from four
(4) to six (6) inches in the height of the abutting sidewalks
existed. Over the objection of the defendant, the plaintiff was
permitted to show that other persons had stumbled at the point
where she was alleged to have received injuries. The court in
overruling these objections stated, "The testimony is admis-
(1901) 25 Mont. 410, 65 P. 140.
"(1911) 43 Mont. 526, 117 P. 893.
14R. C. M. 1935, §5080.
'"(1911) 45 Mont. 46, 121 P. 878.
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sible . .. not only for the purpose of showing the dangerous
character of the place, but as bearing upon the question of
constructive notice to the city."
Conceding that Montana had adopted both the actual and
the constructive notice theories, yet the legislature in 1937,
seemingly unsatisfied with past legislation and decisions,
amended Section 5080 and expressly provided for actual no-
tice." The amendment reads as follows:
"Before any city or town in this State shall be liable
for damages to person and/or property for, or on account
of, any injury or loss alleged to have been received or suf-
fered by reason of any defect or obstructions in any bridge,
street, road, sidewalk, culvert, park, public ground, ferry-
boat, or public works of any kind in said city or town, it
must first be shown that said city or town had actual no-
tice of such defect or obstruction and reasonable oppor-
tunity to repair such defect or remove such defect or remove
such obstruction before such injury or damage was re-
ceived; the city clerk must make a permanent record of all
such reported defects and shall report to the city street
co umissioner immediately upon notice of such defect or ob-
struction; and the person alleged to have suffered such in-
jury or damage, or someone in his behalf, shall give to
the city or town council, commission, manager, or other
governing body of such city or town, within sixty days
after such injury is alleged to have been received or suf-
fered, written notice thereof, which notice shall state the
time when and the place where such injury alleged to have
occurred. Provided, however, that this section shall not
exempt cities and towns from liability for negligence be-
cause of failure to properly place signs, markers or signals
to warn persons of excavations or other obstructions exist-
ing and caused by said city or town, upon any bridge,
street, alley, road, sidewalk, pavement, culvert, park, pub-
lic ground, ferry-boat or public works of any kind."
The first case to be reported under the amended section
was Maring v. City of Billings." The plaintiff brought an
action against the City of Billings to recover for personal in-
juries sustained in a fall into an excavation. The excavation
was directly in front of a lot on which a new house was under
construction and the excavation had been made in laying a
water pipe in order to make a connection with the city water
'GCh. 122, LAWS OF MONTANA (1937).
"(1943) 115 Mont. 249, 142 P. (2d) 361.
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main. The court held in effect that the city had not received
actual notice even though a building permit was issued.
Chief Justice Johnson (Specially Concurring) pointed out
that "the amendment to section 5080 completely covers the field
in question and constitutes an enactment that unless actual no-
tice, not constructive or substituted notice, is had, the city shall
not be liable."
The decision in Maring v. City of Billings was affirmed in
the recent case of Lazich v. City of Butte." In that case a boy
was injured by a fall over some building material placed on the
sidewalk by a person who held a building permit from the city.
The court in denying relief stated: "The granting of the build-
ing permit by the city did not give the city notice of the ob-
struction required by statute."'
It is generally held that if the defective condition is due to
the act of the city itself or to negligence in connection with acts
of others such as contractors or employees, no notice of any
kind, either actual or constructive is necessary." In other words,
where an agent of the city creates the defect by an authorized
act, the law imputes notice to the city. The Montana court fol-
lowed the general rule in Barry v. City of Butte.' In that case
the plaintiff brought an action for injuries sustained when the
ground gave way beneath her as the result of the city's negli-
gence in construction of a catch basin. The court held:
"The rule is that if as here the defective condition
is due to the act of the municipality itself or to its negli-
gence, no notice of such condition is necessary, even where
actual notice is expressly required by statute. It is only
when the defect or danger arises from other means than
the act of the city that the city is excused until notice is
received.' "
The amendment to section 5080 expressly provides that
cities and towns shall not be exempt from liability for negli-
gence because of failure to properly place signs, markers or sig-
nals to warn persons of excavations or other obstructions exist-
"(1945) .... Mont...... .... P. (2d) ..........
"Mr. Justice Adair (dissenting) stated: "Actual notice of the defect is
not required where as here alleged the city had issued a permit or
otherwise authorized another to tear up a public street for its private
use."
2°McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1945) §2997, p. 294.
'(1943) 115 Mont. 224, 142 P. (2d) 571.
'Justice Adair ably points out that when the dangerous condition is
caused by agents of the city in the prosecution of their employment,
the rule of liability i8 not ba-sed upon notice and failure to repair, but
upon the creation of a daznoerou8 condition by the city.
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ing and caused by the city. The Montana court has held that
if such conditions prevail, neither actual notice of defects nor
written notice of resulting injury need be given to the city.
In Maynard v. City of Helena a minor was killed when he rode
a bicycle over an embankment on a sharp curve in one of the
streets of Helena. The court held that the city was negligent
in its failure to erect a barrier at the point in question and in
failure to warn'the' deceased of the dangerous condition of the
corner. Under such conditions notice to the city was not nec-
essary.
In conclusion it may be stated that from 1901 to 1925 Mon-
tana decisions held municipal corporations liable for negligently
maintained defects and obstructions in streets or sidewalks, pro-
viding the city had either actual or constructive notice. If
constructive notice was imputed to the city, a reasonable length
of time after such constructive notice must be given the city
to enable the city to correct the defect or remove the obstruc-
tion. In 1925 the legislature passed a statute which necessi-
tated giving notice of defects to the city within sixty (60) days
after the alleged injury as a condition precedent to recovery.
However this notice was not necessary if the defective condi-
tion was due to the fault of the municipality itself. In the
same year, the legislature abolished the liability of cities and
towns for accumulations of ice and snow on sidewalks and in
streets. From 1937 to the present date the Montana decisions
have held municipalities are not liable for any damage to
persons or property for defects an any property or structure
under control of the municipality unless. it first be shown that
the municipality had actual notice of the defect causing the in-
jury. However, no notice is necessary if the defective condition
was due to the act of the municipality itself. or to its negligence,
or if the city or town was negligent because of failure properly
to place signs, markers, or signals to warn persons of excava-
tions or obstructions.
Marvin E. Hagen.
(1945) .... Mont ..... 160 P. (2d) 484.
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